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Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities: The Time
Has Come

I. INTRODUCTION

The insurance and banking industries have been fighting for
years over the expansion of banks into the insurance market. Battles
have raged between bank and insurance regulators, in courtrooms
across the nation, and in the halls of Congress.2 However, in
response to market forces,3 court rulings,4 and other recent

developments,5 the insurance industry has reconsidered its long-held
resistance to increased bank involvement in insurance.6 Conceding

1. See infranotes 42-95 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 42-95 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Peter Duran, Insurance and Banks: Is the Fight Over?, ERNST &
YOUNG INS. ExEcutvE, Spring 1997, at 3, 5. The insurance industry needs an improved
distribution system and a way to better capitalize on technological advances. See id. The
current agency and brokerage method is inefficient and expensive. See id. In addition,
affiliations with banks can provide an insurer with access to technological advances already
implemented by the banks. See id. For example, customer databases and internet access at
banks can be used to more effectively identify and reach potential customers. See id.; see
also Michelle Clayton, IIAA Switch Could Fuel Restructurings, THE INS. ACCT., Jan. 27,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7885569 (citing Paul Equale, Senior Vice President of
Government Affair, Independent Insurance Agents of America (IIAA), who noted
marketplace convergence of the financial services industry as a reason for the IIAA's new
position on bank and insurance affiliations).
4. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); NationsBank of North
Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995); Independent Ins. Agents
of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also infra notes 55-66 and accompanying
text.
5. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has issued a series of
new opinions and regulations significantly expanding bank insurance powers. See infra
notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
6. See Mark H. Anderson, U.S. Insurers Moderate Stance on Financial Services
Reform, Dow JONES NEWS SERv., Feb. 11, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWSPLUS Database (noting that the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI),
the largest trade group for the insurance industry, has "'reversed its policy on affiliations
and hopes that this action will facilitate the development of legislation that is fair across the
board') (quoting Roy Albertalli, Vice President, ACLI, at a House Banking Committee
hearing on financial services reform); see also Insurance Agents to End Turf War with
Banks, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Jan. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7077128 (citing a policy
statement issued by Paul A. Equale, Senior Vice President for Governmental Affairs for the
IIAA at a Jan. 16, 1997 news conference).
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their losses on the regulatory and judicial fronts, insurance interests
are now looking toward compromise with the banking industry!
The insurance industry has reversed its long standing opposition to
bank and insurer affiliations and now, subject to certain conditions,8
is pursuing the opportunity to join forces with banking interests.'
On the other hand, national banks, which are the focus of this
Comment,"0 were once strong proponents of legislative reform that
would allow access to insurance markets, but now may no longer be
as eager for financial modernization legislation." This change in
7. See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
8. See Alan Yonan Jr., Insurance Agents Vow to Work with Banks on Reform Bill,
Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 16, 1997, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS
Database ("IIAA supports financial services affiliations with two vital conditions: First,
state regulation of insurance must be preserved through absolute functional regulation.
Second, adequate consumer safeguards must be adopted, either at the federal or state level,
or at both levels."') (quoting an IIAA policy statement'issued on Jan. 16, 1997).
9. See InsuranceAgent's to End Turf War with Banks, supra note 6. Paul A. Equale,
Senior Vice President of Government Affairs for IIAA, stated, "The market place has
changed [and insurance agents] should look toward the next 50 years, not look back at the
last 50 years." Id. In addition, Ronald A. Smith, President of IIAA, is quoted as saying:
to the banks we say, come talk to us. IIAA members want to set up
joint marketing arrangements. If you want to sell insurance, come talk
to the insurance experts. Additionally, many IIAA member agencies
want to explore offering your products to customers. Yes, the market is
evolving, but customers still want and demand professional expertise
and service.
Id.
10. This Comment focuses primarily on the activities of national banks because
currently national banks have the best opportunity of bank and bank affiliated institutions
for expansion into insurance related activities. See infra notes 42-95 and accompanying
text (discussing the insurance powers of national banks). Although nonbanking subsidiaries
of bank holding companies and state banks are engaging in insurance activities, these
activities are limited and provide less opportunity for expansion. Nonbanking subsidiaries
of bank holding companies are permitted to engage in activities closely related to banking,
however, their insurance activities were dramatically reduced in 1982 when Congress
amended the Bank Holding Company Act in the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994) (indicating that "for purposes of this
subsection it is not closely related to the business of banking or managing or controlling
banks for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or broker").
The Act does, however, provide for limited insurance activities including certain
grandfathered activities, credit related insurance, agency activities in small towns, and
agency activities of certain small bank holding companies. See id. A state bank, regulated
by the appropriate state authority, must be permitted by state law to engage in insurance
activities. Furthermore, even if permitted by state law, since 1992 state banks have been
specifically prohibited from engaging in insurance underwriting except to the extent
permitted for national banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 la(b).
11. See ACLI ChiefSees Continued Bank-Insurance Conflict, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Oct.
8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7078914. Carroll Campbell, Jr., President and Chief
Executive Officer of the American Council of Life Insurance and former governor of South
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attitude comes as a result of recent court decisions and administrative
rulings that have given national banks increased opportunities in the
world of insurance despite a lack of legislative changes. 2 However,
discontent in the legislature could threaten current and future bank
insurance powers. 3 Thus, national banks should also be ready to sit
at the negotiating table in an atmosphere of compromise.
Both the banking and insurance industries see advantages in
affiliations. However, an issue has arisen regarding the appropriate
regulatory structure. 4 Currently, national banks are regulated at the

federal level by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC),
and insurance companies are regulated by the states." As national
banks begin to cross traditional industry lines; however, the current

regulatory responsibilities begin to overlap.1 6 As a result, conflicts
have developed when trying to fit the new bank insurance activities
into the existing regulatory structure. The debate is over which
regulator is responsible for the different financial transactions. 7
Some argue that regulation should be based on the organization that

conducts the transaction or entity regulation, while others believe
that regulation should be according to the transaction or functional

Carolina, is noted as saying that bankers are "convinced they're getting a better deal from
the Comptroller and the courts than from the legislators, so 'they're not anxious to see any
reform bill passed."' Id.
12. See infra notes 42-95 and accompanying text.
13. A financial modernization bill, entitled the Financial Services Competition Act of
1997, approved by the House Banking Committee on June 20, 1997, "contains significant
rollbacks in the current authority of national banks, imposes unique new burdens on all
banks relative to their competitors, and imposes new sets of regulatory requirements." OCC
Lawyer Slams FinancialModernization Bill, BEST's INS. NEWS, July 7, 1997, availablein
1997 WL 7078222 (quoting Letter from Julie Williams, General Counsel, Office of the
Comptroller of Currency, to Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, June 24, 1997)
(on file with OCC).
14. See infra notes 123-79 (discussing functional versus entity regulation).
15. See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
16. For example, the OCC has recently issued guidelines to banks for selling insurance
discussing the application of state insurance laws and the extent to which those laws will be
applicable to national banks. See OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, Guidance to National Banks
on Insurance and Annuity Sales Activities, [Vol. 4 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 35-463 (Oct. 8, 1996) [hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter 96-8].
17. See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.

458

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 2

regulation. 8
This Comment evaluates the advantages and
disadvantages of functional versus entity regulation. 9
Part II of this Comment provides background information
regarding the banking and insurance industries' historical roles and
the most recent changes in those roles. 2 Part III provides details on
the current state of affairs, including the change in the insurance
industry's position regarding bank and insurer affiliations and the
push for financial modernization.2
Part IV discusses financial
reform and suggests that section 92 of the National Bank Act should
be repealed and replaced with comprehensive and unified financial
legislation. It further discusses functional versus entity regulation
and suggests that reform should pave the way for financial services
affiliations operating under a functional, rather than institutional,
regulatory scheme.22 Finally, Part V concludes that legislative
change is inevitable and compromises and concessions from both
industries are necessary to ensure positive steps are taken toward
effective and beneficial financial reform.23

II.BACKGROUND
A.

Early Insurance andBanking Roles

National banks are regulated by the OCC within the
Department of the Treasury. 24 The National Bank Act provides the
statutory authority for the powers of national banks.2 Specifically,
section 24 (Seventh) indicates that national banks are authorized to
engage in deposit taking, credit granting, credit exchange, and "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business
of banking."26 Until 1916, it was universally understood that
insurance was not incidental to banking and thus national banks were
18. See infra notes 123-40 (discussing functional versus entity regulation).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infr notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.

24. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1994).
25. See id.
§§ 21-216d.
26. Id. § 24 (Seventh).
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prohibited from engaging in the business of insurance." Section 24
(Seventh), therefore, was not originally seen as a source for bank
insurance powers. Subsequently, on September 7, 1916, due to

growing concern over the financial stability of nationally chartered
banks in small towns, 28 Congress enacted section 92 of Title 12 of
the United States Code.29 Section 92 permits national banks located

in towns of less than five thousand in population to act as insurance
agents.3"

The primary congressional purpose of section 92 was to

provide another source of income for the struggling national banks
that were located in small towns. 3' As a result, for at least the first
half of the century, it was understood that this source of bank
insurance powers, specifically agency activities, 32 would be limited
geographically to customers in these small communities.33
27. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d. 1010, 1013 (5th
Cir. 1968) (noting that "prior to the 1916 enactment of [s]ection 92 it seems to have been
universally understood that no national bank possessed any power to act as insurance
agents").
28. See generally Kevin M. Lesperance, A Unique PreemptionProblem: The Insurance
and Banking Industries Engage in War, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1141 (1997).
29. The statute provides, in relevant part, the following:
In addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking
associations organized under the laws of the United States any such
association located and doing business in any place the population of
which does not exceed five thousand ... may, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency,
act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized
by the authorities of the State in which said bank is located to do
business in said [s]tate ....
12 U.S.C. § 92.
30. See id.
31. See Lesperance, supra note 28, at 1150 (citing Letter from John Skelton Williams,
Comptroller of the Currency, to Congress, 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916)). At the time of
its enactment, section 92 left the general rule regarding a bank's insurance power mostly
intact, providing only a limited exception. See id. In a letter to Congress, then Comptroller
of the Currency, John Skelton Williams, noted that it is "desirable from the standpoint of
public policy and banking efficiency that [authority to sell insurance] should be limited to
banks in small communities." Id. at 1150 n.67. He further noted that the additional income
would strengthen the small town bank's financial position; however, due to the limited
insurance markets in these small communities, the activity would not be enough to distract
the bank from its primary purpose of a lending and depository institution. See id.
32. Section 92 expressly provides for insurance agency activity. It does not, however,
provide banks with power to underwrite insurance. See 12 U.S.C. § 92.
33. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d. 1010, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1968). While not directly addressing the issue of whether a national bank in a small
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The insurance industry, on the other hand, has traditionally
been and currently is regulated by the states.34 Up until 1944, the
courts had interpreted the business of insurance as outside of the
Commerce Clause and, thus, not subject to federal regulation."
However, the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern
UnderwritersAss 'n3 6 reversed this position and held that insurance
was commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.37 The

result of this ruling was that insurance activities could, in fact, be
subject to federal regulation.38
Congress reacted swiftly, however, to return the insurance
powers back to the states. In 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act39
overruled the South-Eastern Underwritersdecision proclaiming that
"the continued regulation and taxation by the several states of the
business of insurance is in the public's best interest."4
The
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that any state statute enacted to
"regulate the business of insurance" will preempt a conflicting
federal statute unless the federal statute "specifically relates to the
business of insurance."' This statute is sometimes referred to as the
reverse preemption statute.

town is geographically limited to that small town, the court refers to the letter received by
the then Comptroller, John Skelton Williams, discussed supra note 28. See id. Williams
supported the adoption of section 92 and indicated that "the amount of insurance policies
written or mortgages to be placed on commission is not sufficient to take up the entire time
of an insurance broker, and the bank is not therefore likely to trespass upon outside business
naturally belonging to others." Id.; see also Lesperance, supra note 28.
34. See Lesperance, supranote 28, at 1157.
35. See SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (noting that until the Court's
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), it had been
assumed based on Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183-85 (1868), that "issuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce").
36. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
37. See id. at 553.
38. See id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
40. See id. "Congress was mainly concerned with the relationship between insurance
rate making and the antitrust laws and the power of the States to tax insurance companies."
National Securities, 393 U.S. at 458. Note, however, that in 1948, Congress expressly
indicated that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not a blanket anti-trust exemption for
insurance entities. They expressly indicated that antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by [s]tate law." 15
U.S.C. § 1012.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
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The OCC Expansion of Bank InsurancePowers

Until the middle of the twentieth century, the respective
industries focused on their primary functions. Eventually, however,
banking interests looked to both section 24 (Seventh) and section 92
as sources for bank insurance powers. In the early 1960's, the
Comptroller of the Currency, James Saxon, began to explore the
possible expansion of banking activities. 4 2 In 1962, the OCC issued
an administrative ruling that allowed national banks to act as agents
in the sale of insurance under the theory that the activity was
incidental to the business of banking.4 3 The ruling, however, was
overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Saxon v. GeorgiaAss 'n of Independent InsuranceAgents"
holding that section 24 (Seventh) is not a source of insurance powers
for banks.45
The OCC eventually continued its efforts to expand bank
insurance activities, this time, however, focusing on the insurance
powers of section 92.46 Although previously viewed as a limited

42. See Lesperance, supra note 28, at 1151. In 1962, the Comptroller of the Currency,
James Saxon, created a National Advisory Committee on Banking Regulatory Policies and
Practices to investigate potential changes to the then-existing banking laws. The
Committee recommended that national banks should be able to sell insurance. See id.
(citing Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d. 1010, 1012 (5th Cir.
1968)).
43. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1968). A bank is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) to engage in any activities
that are "incidental" to banking. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Although
section 92 authorizes insurance agency activities, it is limited to banks operating out of
small towns. See 12 U.S.C. § 92.
44. 399 F.2d. 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). In Saxon v. GAIIA, Citizens and Southern National
Bank of Georgia (Citizens) applied for and received the OCC's permission to sell insurance
from its Atlanta offices. See id. at 1011. The Georgia Independent Insurance Agents filed
suit against Saxon, the Comptroller of the Currency, and Citizens. The Fifth Circuit upheld
the district court's analysis that section 92 was the full extent of a bank's insurance power,
and thus the OCC could not authorize Citizen's to sell insurance out of a town with greater
than five thousand people. See id. at 1012. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning was based on the
congressional intentions behind the enactment of section 92. See id. at 1016.
45. See id.at 1012.
46. See infra note 48 and accompanying text; see also OCC Interpretive Letter 623,
State Law Restriction on National Bank Authority to Sell Annuities, [1993-1994] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,505 (Sept. 24, 1993). The OCC ruled that a national bank can
sell annuity products under the National Bank Act's incidental powers provision. See id.
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bank insurance power, section 92, with a slight twist on
interpretation, is now seen as the doorway allowing banks to enter

the insurance arena.47 In 1986, in response to a request by the
National Bank of Oregon (NBO), the OCC issued an interpretative
letter stating that national banks have the power under section 92 to

sell insurance anywhere as long as the bank or branch is located in a
small town.4" As a result, the OCC permitted NBO to sell insurance
nationally from Banks, Oregon--a town of less than five thousand.49
The insurance industry, again threatened by the entry of
banks into the once exclusive insurance market, began to look for
ways in both the courts and the legislature to preclude national banks
from playing in the insurance field."0 The OCC's expansive
interpretations prompted a series of suits by insurance interests."' The
efforts were, for the most part, unsuccessful.5 2 The defeats resulted,
in part, from the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3 In Chevron, the Court

indicated that it would afford increased judicial deference to the
interpretations of less than clear statutory language by the
administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute.54 As a
result, the OCC was given greater flexibility in more expansively
interpreting both section 92 and section 24 (Seventh) to include bank
insurance powers at least to the extent its interpretations are not
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute.

47. In accordance with the decision in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the courts will now defer to the reasonable
interpretation of the Comptroller. See infra note 53. Therefore, Chevron allows for an
interpretation of section 92 that is more favorable to national banks. See infra notes 61-67
and accompanying text.
48. See OCC Interpretive Letter 366, National Bank May Sell Insurance to Customers
Residing Outside Small town Where Its Main Office or Branch Is Located, [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). This ruling was
based on the theory that section 92 does not address geographical limitations. See id.
49. See id. This ruling was challenged and upheld in Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v.
Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See infra note 55.
50. See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)
(discussed infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text); IIAA v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958
(discussed infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text).
52. See VALIC, 513 U.S. 251;IIAA v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958.
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. See id.
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For example, in Independent Insurance Agents of America.,
Inc. v. Ludwig," the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia determined that in section 92 Congress did not address
the issue of geographical limits on the insurance operations of
national banks operating out of small towns.56 Furthermore, the
court held that the OCC's interpretation regarding the location of
current and potential customers was reasonable in light of the
ambiguity of the statute. 7 Thus, despite the protests of the insurance
industry, and arguably original congressional intent," the D.C.

circuit held national banks could sell insurance to customers living
outside of small towns.59
This holding resulted in a significant blow to the insurance

industry. Since the insurance industry is not represented by a federal
agency, it is bound by the Comptroller's interpretation.
Consequently, the insurance interests are concerned that the

Comptroller's conclusions may not be impartial especially if the
agency identifies with the industry it is charged with regulating.6 °

55. 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This suit was a challenge to the Comptroller's
interpretative ruling regarding the insurance activities of the National Bank of Oregon. See
supra note 48. Trade associations representing insurance agents and underwriters argued
that the Comptroller exceeded his statutory authority. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Comptroller. See National Ass'n of Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F.
Supp. 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the district court on the grounds that Congress had repealed section 92, and thus
there was no basis for the Comptroller's conclusions. The Court found that the 1952
edition of the U.S. Code omitted section 92 with a note indicating that Congress had
repealed it in 1918. The provision was left out of each subsequent edition until 1994. See
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The
Supreme Court, however, pointing to clerical errors, found that section 92 had not been
repealed despite its textual omission and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
56. See JIAA v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d at 961.
57. See id.
58. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
59. See id. But see Variable Annuity Life Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that section 92 precluded the Comptroller from permitting the sale of annuities by
banks as incidental to banking). The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the conflict among
the courts in NationsBank by overturning the 5th Circuit. See infranote 61.
60. See, e.g., NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995),
(holding that contrary to insurance industry treatment and in accord with the Comptroller's
interpretation, an annuity is not an insurance product).
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In NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.
(VALIC), 6' the Supreme Court confirmed the power of the OCC by
affording it great judicial deference in the interpretation of what
constitutes the business of banking pursuant to section 24
(Seventh). 2 The Court ruled as reasonable the OCC's determination
that the sale of annuities, a traditional insurance industry product, is
incidental to the business of banking. 63 Thus, national banks can
permissibly sell these annuities pursuant to section 24 (Seventh). 64
Furthermore, the Comptroller concluded that even though an
annuity had been traditionally treated as an insurance product it was,
in fact, a financial investment instrument. 65 Consequently, since the

Comptroller did not consider annuities to be insurance, this activity
was not considered within the reaches of the McCarran-Ferguson

Act.

Thus, banks may not be subject to the state regulatory

requirements imposed on insurance companies selling the same
product. 66 The OCC's determination that the annuity was not an
insurance product, coupled with the Supreme Court's judicial
deference to the agency's interpretation, enabled the banking
industry to successfully engage in a traditional insurance activity.
Furthermore, it "sent a message concerning the OCC's power to
expansively interpret the National Bank Act. 6 7 It follows, therefore,
that the Comptroller's seeming ability to unilaterally define

61. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
62. See id. The Court expressly held that "the 'business of banking' is not limited to
the enumerated powers in section 24 (Seventh) and that the Comptroller therefore has
discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated." Id. at 258 n.2.
63. See id. at 264 ("[w]e respect as reasonable the Comptroller's conclusion that
brokerage of annuities is an 'incidental powe[r] ...necessary to carry on the business of
banking').
64. See id.; see also supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Because annuities are
not considered insurance, it is unclear whether section 24 (Seventh) would prove to be a
source of power to engage in insurance activities or whether section 92 is the sole source of
insurance powers for national banks. If the Comptroller were to determine that an insurance
activity is incidental to banking as provided for under section 24 (Seventh), the activity may
still be subject to the reverse preemption provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act because
section 24 (Seventh) is not a federal statute that specifically relates to the business of
insurance and thus subject to preemption by a conflicting state law.
65. See VALIC, 513 U.S. at 264.
66. See id. (holding that "we further defer to the Comptroller's reasonable
determination that 12 U.S.C. § 92 is not implicated because annuities are not insurance
within the meaning of that section").
67. Lesperance, supra note 28, at 1156.
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insurance may enhance a national bank's ability to avoid restrictive
state laws and thus gain a competitive advantage over insurers
offering the same products.
At the same time it challenged the expansion of bank
insurance powers in the courts, the insurance industry also pursued
its defensive agenda in the state legislatures.68 Many states, under
the perceived authority of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, passed antiaffiliation statutes that essentially precluded or severely restricted
banks from conducting insurance activities.69 The passage of these

statutes resulted in even more litigation; this time, however, it was
instigated by banking interests.7"

Initially, the court rulings were

split on whether section 92 could preempt state anti-affiliation laws
in light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act;7 however, the OCC and
banking interests prevailed.7 z
In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,73 the
Supreme Court invalidated state anti-affiliation statutes that
precluded a bank from selling insurance out of a town of less than
five thousand.74 In Barnett, a national bank located in Florida, was

selling insurance from a small town pursuant to section 92, but in
violation of a conflicting Florida statute.

The Supreme Court

reasoned that section 92 was a federal law that "specifically relates to
68. See Karol K. Sparks, Towards Functional Regulation: Untangling Bank and
Insurance Law, in THE NEW BuSINEss OF BANKING: WHAT BANKS CAN Do Now, at 595,
618 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-912, 1995).
69. See id. at 606 & n.26. Anti-affiliation jurisdictions include Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. See id. However, as
a result of the Barnett decision, see infra note 73, many states are amending their antiaffiliation statutes.
70. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d. 388 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the Kentucky anti-affiliation statute was enacted to regulate the business of banking,
not insurance, and thus section 92 preempted the state statute); Barnett Bank v. Gallagher,
43 F.3d. 631 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding that section 92 did not specifically relate to the
business of insurance, and therefore the state anti-affiliation statute, designed to protect
policyholders, preempted section 92 under the McCarran-Ferguson Act), rev'd sub nom.,
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
72. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
73. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
74. See id. at 26.
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the business of insurance" and thus is exempt from the McCarranFerguson reverse preemption rule." The Court found that the state

law prohibiting the bank from selling insurance was invalid in the
face of section 92.76
As banks expand their insurance powers, the applicability of
state insurance laws becomes an issue. Barnett helps to clarify the
extent to which state laws regulating insurance will be preempted by
section 92." If the state law prevents or significantly impairs a

national banks' insurance powers under section 92, either by treating
banks differently than other insurance sellers or by applying the state
laws in such a manner to have a disparate impact, then it will be

invalid.78
The OCC has issued guidelines to national banks regarding
insurance and annuity sales. 79 The guidelines indicate that "a state
law that applies generally to regulate insurance agents and agencies
will apply to national banks provided the law does not effectively
prevent national banks from conducting activities authorized under
federal law.""0 The OCC acknowledges that the Court in Barnett
indicated that their decision did not "deprive [s]tates of the power to
regulate national banks where ... doing so does not prevent or

significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its
powers."'" Interestingly, however, the OCC defines "significantly
interferes" as anything other than "in an insignificant way."82 The
guidelines essentially indicate that bank insurance sales will be

75. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994)); see also supra notes 40-41 and

accompanying text.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994). Julie Williams, Chief Counsel of the OCC, noted
that:
Barnett makes clear that a class of laws preventing national banks from
engaging in insurance sales under section 92 are preempted by federal
law. At the next level are those state laws that do not prevent, but do
impact or limit in some way, the ability of national banks to exercise
their insurance powers.
Julie L. Williams et al., After Barnett: The Intersection of NationalBank InsurancePowers
and State Regulation, I N.C. BANKiNG INST. 13, 35 (1997).
77. See Barnett, 517 U.S. 25.
78. See Williams et al., supranote 76, at 35.
79. See OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, supra note 16.
80. Id. at 35,756.
81. Id..
82. Id.
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regulated by the states; however, the OCC will retain preemptory
ability.
C.

The OCC'sExpansive Powers

The Supreme Court's unanimous decisions in VALIC and
Barnett provided support for the authority of the OCC to expand
national bank insurance powers."
As a result, the current
Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene A. Ludwig, began to issue new
opinions and regulations increasing national banks' foothold in the
insurance markets."
In November 1996, the OCC issued an
interpretive letter to First Union Corporation in which it ruled that
section 92 did not geographically restrict the bank to selling
insurance within the small town. 5 The OCC declared that as long as
a bona fide bank or branch was located in a town of less than five
thousand persons, a bank could sell to customers anywhere. 6 At
least one district court, deferring to the reasonable interpretation of
the Comptroller, has upheld the interpretation. 7 This ruling, coupled
with the Barnett decision, essentially allows a national bank with a
small town branch to sell insurance without a geographical limitation
and notwithstanding state insurance statutes to the contrary. 8

83. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
85. See OCC Interpretive Letter 753, Establishment of Operating Subsidiaries to
Engage in Insurance Agency Activities, [1996-97 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-107 (Nov. 4, 1996) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter 753]. The OCC had
earlier determined that section 92 did not geographically restrict the bank to customers
within the small town. See OCC Interpretive Letter 366, supra note 48; supra note 48 and
accompanying text. The interpretive letter to First Union further indicated that the
marketing activities of the bank or branch were not limited to the small town and could be
conducted out of other locations by agents. First Union, however, would manage all
activities and agents out of the small town office. See OCC Interpretive Letter 753, supra.
86. See OCC Interpretive Letter 753, supranote 85.
87. See Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N.A. v. Googins, 965 F. Supp. 304 (D. Conn.
1997).
88. See generally Ronald R. Glancz et al., Bank Insurance Sales Spark Regulatory
Rumblings, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at C2. The Barnett decision did not address whether
section 92 imposed geographical limitations. Thus, OCC Interpretative Letter 753 allows
banks to sell annuities beyond the small town's borders.
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In addition to finding insurance agency powers in section 92
and section 24 (Seventh), the OCC has also taken other action to
open the door for underwriting of insurance by banks.8 9 The OCC

revised its corporate activities regulation and enacted the Operating
Subsidiary rule effective December 31, 1996.90

Under the rule,

certain well-managed, well-capitalized banks may apply to have a
subsidiary engage in activities that are part of the business of

banking or incidental to banking, but that are not necessarily
permissible for the bank itself.9 As a result, a national bank may
potentially look to an operating subsidiary to conduct insurance
underwriting activities.'
For example, in May 1997, the OCC approved Banc One's

proposal to establish an operating subsidiary to reinsure a portion of
the mortgage insurance on their loans.93 Reinsurance is an insurance
activity with some of the benefits and most of the risks of direct
underwriting.94 Insurance interests fear these decisions will allow an
avenue for insurance underwriting by national banks.9"

89. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
90. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1997).
91. See generally William T. McCuiston, NationalBank OperatingSubsidiaries: How
FarHas the OCC Opened the Door to Nonbanking Activities?, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 264
(1998) (discussing applications under the new Part 5 regulations); see also Glancz et al.,
supranote 88, at C2.
92. See Glancz, supra note 88, at C2.
93. See OCC Corporate Decision 97-27, Notification by Banc One, Columbus, N.A.,
Columbus, Ohio, of its Intent to Establish an Operating Subsidiary to Reinsure mortgage
Insurance (May 2, 1997), available in 1997 WL 272587.
94. Reinsurance is the assumption of all or part of a risk originally undertaken by an
insurer. "It binds the reinsurer to pay to the reinsured the whole loss sustained in respect to
the subject of the insurance to the extent to which he is reinsured." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990). Although the reinsurer, in this case the bank, is not the
primary contact with the insured, they will receive the premium and pay out any losses
associated with the risk that was assumed. See Once Invincible Ludwig is Put on the
Defense, BEST'S INS. NEWS, May 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7077807. Banks face
great risk with reinsuring or underwriting its own mortgages. See id. ("One need only
consider the millions of dollars in damage generated by Hurricane Andrew to understand
that a tremendous risk of loss attaches to mortgage insurance.") (quoting Barbara Synder,
Vice President for Financial Reporting, National Academy of Actuaries).
95. See, e.g., Duran, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the operating subsidiary rule does
not specifically raise the issue of whether a subsidiary could engage in insurance activities,
but that it does give the OCC the authority to decide what activities the subsidiary can
engage in, including insurance).
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III. INDUSTRY REACTION AND CONCERNS

The sweeping Supreme Court decisions96 and the OCC's
continued aggressive position, have prompted several political and
legislative changes. 97 For the past 100 years, the insurance industry
has opposed bank entry into the insurance business.98 The insurance
interests feared that banks will enjoy unfair competitive advantages. 99
The insurance industry reasoned that since national banks are
regulated federally, they may not necessarily be playing by the same
rules as insurers who are subject to varying state regulations
regarding capital' and licensing requirements.'0 ' In addition, the
insurance industry expressed concern that consumer protection
safeguards would deteriorate if banks, regulated under the current
institutional scheme, were allowed to conduct insurance activities."0 2
However, as a result of the above-mentioned Supreme Court
decisions, administrative rulings, and changing market forces, the
96. See supra notes 53-88 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 42-95 and accompanying text.
98. See Clayton, supra note 3 (quoting Paul Equale, Senior Vice President of
Government Affairs, IIAA).
99. See Duran, supra note 3, at 4 ("Convinced that expanded bank insurance powers
would give banks an unfair competitive advantage, both life and property/casualty agency
associations have vigorously opposed further bank entry into insurance." ).
100. See Kentucky Official Seeks Respect for State Regulators, BEST'S INS. News, July
21, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 7078313. George Nichols III, Kentucky Commissioner of
Insurance, in testimony before the House Commerce Committee on July 17, 1997, noted
that "since the Federal Reserve would set capital requirements ... this would impinge on
the ability of state insurance regulators to ensure proper capital standards for entities that
underwrite insurance products." Id.
101. See Sparks, supra note 68, at 618 ("The Comptroller has claimed preemption not
only of the licensing of banks, but of the licensing of bank employees as well.") (referring
to OCC Interpretive Letter 623, supra note 46, and OCC Interpretive Letter 475).
102. See id. at 497 ("The Comptroller appears to recognize the massive undertaking it
would assume if it should disenfranchise states from national bank insurance powers. It
generally admits the valid role of state laws as a matter of sound business practices.").
Other consumer protection concerns commonly identified include: consumer perception
that products are federally insured; credit that is contingent on the purchase of insurance
products; the actual illegal tying of products; and the non-application of state licensing
requirements. See generally Consumers Fear and are Confused by Banks Selling
Insurance-AA Survey, 1997 INS. INDus. LMG. REP. (ANDREws) 22327 (July 2, 1997)
[hereinafter IIAA Survey] (citing a national survey conducted by International
Communications Research, Media, Pennsylvania, released June 9, 1997 by the Independent
Insurance Agents Association).
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insurance industry has fundamentally changed its policy and now

supports bank and insurer affiliations.

3

Politically, insurance

interests are no longer trying to keep the two industries separated,
rather are now focusing on the advantages that the respective
industries can offer each other."° In addition, several states have
enacted statutes or issued guidelines that allow bank and insurer
affiliations.'
These changes have created the opportunity for both
industries to work toward a common goal.
The events that led up to the present environment have
created an ideal, perhaps even critical, opportunity for substantial
financial reform." 6 Fueled by the VALIC and Barnett decisions and
the subsequent about-face by the insurance industry, financial reform

has gained new life."0 7 For the first time, insurers are willing to sit
down at the table in an atmosphere of compromise.'08 They are
resigned to the inevitable entry of banks into the insurance market
and are cooperating in hopes to ensure that new legislation is fair. 9

103. See Anderson, supra note 6; Yonan, supra note 8; Insurance Agents to end Turf
War with Banks, supra note 6.
104. For a discussion of the advantages banks offer, see Duran, supra note 3, at 5.
These advantages include the banks' existing network of offices and branches in virtually
every neighborhood, comprehensive customer databases for both individual and business
clients, banks' strength in leveraging technology to more efficiently reach customers, and
higher consumer confidence and trust. See id.
105. As a result of the Barnett decision, Florida amended its anti-affiliation statute so
that any bank located in a city of 5000 or less could sell insurance. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
626.988 (West Supp. 1998); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-250(38) (West 1996)
(allowing banks to sell fixed and variable annuities); Letter from Dwight K. Bartlett, III,
Maryland Insurance Commission, and H. Robert Hergenroeder, Maryland Commissioner of
Financial Regulation, to Maryland Bankers (Oct. 31, 1996) (discussing the guidelines for
the sale of insurance by banks in Maryland) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University
of Maryland School of Law); Elton Bomer, Texas Commissioner of Insurance, Texas
Commissioner's Bull. No. B-0043-96, Interim Procedures for Banks Selling Insurance
(June 20, 1996), available in WESTLAW, TX Bulletin B-0043-96 (allowing national and
state chartered banks located in towns of 5000 or fewer people to be licensed to sell
insurance).
106. See supra notes 42-95 and accompanying text.
107. Significant financial modernization bills were proposed at the opening of the 105th
Congress in the wake of the Barnett decision. House Banking Committee Chair Jim Leach
(R-IA) introduced H.R. 10, the Financial Modernization Act of 1997, providing for bank
and insurer affiliations. See infra notes 117-82 and accompanying text (discussing H.R.
10). In addition, Representative Marge Roukema (R-NJ) introduced a separate bill, H.R.
1306, the Depository Institution Affiliation and Thrift Charter Conversion Act, that would
allow affiliations between financial services firms and commercial firms.
108. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6.
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Many insurers are also eager about the opportunity to engage in
traditional banking activities. 1 On the other hand, banks who have
until now enjoyed an expansion of their insurance powers should be
alert to legislators who are concerned with the implications for
consumers and other industries if the administrative agency policy
making continues unchecked."' These changes have removed a key

stumbling block
to financial services reform--insurance industry
2

resistance."
Despite the change in attitude, however, insurance interests
are likely to continue fighting for legislation that addresses their two
primary concerns: fair competition through functional regulation and
consumer protection through the preservation of the state regulatory

scheme."

Likewise, national banks will push for expanded

insurance powers that are not impeded by what they consider to be
discriminatory state insurance laws.

110. As an example, in June 1997 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. filed an
application for a federal savings bank charter with the Office of Thrift Supervision and
applied to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for deposit insurance coverage. See
Insurers Fear Threats to Federal Thrift Charter, BEST'S INS. NEWS, July 28, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7078358. It is important to note that Robert R. Davis, Director of
Government Relations for the America's Community Bankers, noted in a letter to the
Commerce Committee Chairman, Thomas J. Bliley (R-VA) that "unitary thrift holding
companies 'follow strict functional regulation principles."' Id. In August 1997, the
National Association of Mutual 'Insurance Companies submitted a similar application to
establish a bank to provide financial services for its member insurers to sell. See NAMIC to
Start Thrift to Serve Its Member Insurers, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Aug. 20, 1997, available in
1997 WL 7078541. Securities firms such as Principal Financial Group, Travelers Group,
Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. have made similar applications. See id.
I 11. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
accused Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig of undermining the solvency of the
federal deposit insurance fund. Once Invincible Ludwig is Put on the Defensive, supra note
94 ("Above all, I am deeply troubled and concerned that the Comptroller of the Currency's
aggressive actions may, once again, subject federally insured banks to excessive insurance
risks and expose the bank insurance funds, and therefore taxpayers, to unnecessary
liability.") (quoting Senator D'Amato). Furthermore, Representative John Dingell (D-MI),
publicly called for Ludwig's ouster. A top aide for Dingell is quoted as saying, "[w]e're
still trying to get rid of Ludwig." Id.
112. See Clayton, supra note 3.
113. See Yonan, supra note 8.
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IV. FINANCIAL SERVICES REFORM

The time is right and the stage is set for both the banking and
insurance industries to compromise and move forward.
In
implementing financial reform, Congress should repeal section 92 of
the National Bank Act as unnecessary and replace it with legislation
that would allow nondiscriminatory access for both insurers and
banks wishing to enter other financial services markets." 4 It has
been proposed that this legislation should be enacted under a
functional regulatory scheme to ensure: (1) competitive equality, (2)
regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, and (3) adequate consumer
5
protection.'"
A.

RepealingSection 92

Regardless of whether it is currently interpreted by the courts
and regulatory authorities in accordance with original congressional
intent," 6 section 92 has created ambiguity regarding the extent of
bank insurance powers." 7 Furthermore, a national bank's ability to
sell insurance to consumers nationally and to conduct the related
marketing activities from anywhere"' essentially makes the section
92 small town requirement unnecessary. There is no need to require
a national bank to operate out of a small town branch as a mere
formality to nationalized insurance sales. If banks are generally
permitted to sell insurance, then small town banks would also have
the opportunity to boost profits through these activities.
114. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 141-79 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
117. According to some, the resulting interpretations have created conflict and
uncertainty regarding the boundaries of state and federal laws, as well as the appropriate
limits of state and federal regulatory prerogatives. See, e.g., Financial Services
Restructuring:Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financeand Hazardous Materialsof
the Committee of Commerce, 105th Cong. 27-32 (1997) [hereinafter FinancialServices
RestructuringHearings] (statement of Mark Pope, Vice President and Director of Federal
Governmental Relations, Lincoln National Corporation). Pope was expressing his
frustration with the recent regulatory rulings of the OCC. See id.
118. Advances in modem technology, certainly not contemplated by Congress in 1916,
have created a significant loophole for the expansion of banks into insurance activities. See
Sparks, supranote 68, at 604 (citing the court's acknowledgment of technology changes in
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
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Consequently, clarification and reevaluation of congressional
intent is needed and must come from the legislative branch." 9
Section 92 should be repealed and replaced with more specific
language in a comprehensive financial reform package. In the
pursuit of reform, national banks will seek legislation that ensures
their ability to engage in insurance activities. The insurance industry
will try to ensure that competitive equality is inherent in any change.
Finally, those representing the interests of policyholders and
depositors will want to ensure an effective and efficient regulatory
scheme. Legislation that clearly defines the rules and encourages
financial services affiliations will not only serve the interests of both
the banking and insurance industries, but the general public as
well. 20 In addition, financial
services reform will promote
efficiency in the financial markets"' and create incentives for the
development of new and innovative products."

119. See Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(noting that "when time and technology open up a loophole, it is up to Congress to decide
whether it should be plugged, and how").
120. Of concern to those in the banking industry are the state anti-affiliation laws that
restrict or limit a bank's access to insurance markets. See Collins, supra note 116, at 6.
The insurance industry, on the other hand, is concerned with the competitive inequality
among all players in the financial services arena that may result if different regulations are
imposed for similar transactions or if the same regulations are applied inconsistently by
different regulators. See Melanie L. Fein, FunctionalRegulation: A Concept For Glass-

SteagallReform, 2 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 89, 90 (1995). Legislators are eager to increase
the efficiency of the financial markets while maintaining the integrity of consumer
protection laws. Reform that removes the roadblock for financial services affiliations while
implementing a true functional regulatory scheme will alleviate these concerns. See infra
notes 123-79 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text; see also Rubin Offers Blueprintfor
FinancialReform; Details Coming Soon, BANKING POL'Y REP., June 2, 1997, available in

LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin in a speech
to the Exchequer Club of Washington noted that "if increased competition from financial
modernization were to reduce costs to consumers by 1%, that would be a savings of about
$3 billion a year." Id. at 3. Rubin believes the savings could be as high as 5%. See id.
"The bulk of these savings should come as financial services firms, driven by increased
competition, adopt best-practices." Id.
122. See Pamela Atkins, Financial Services Reform: D'Amato. Baker Introduce
Modernization Bill Permitting Merger of Banking, Commerce, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA)

297, 297 (1997) ("my goal in financial modernization is to craft a bill broad enough to
benefit American consumers by improving competition, making more services available,
and allowing more rapid technological innovation in the marketplace") (quoting
Representative Richard Baker (R-LA)).
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FunctionalRegulation

Various legislators and many in the insurance industry have
advanced a functional regulatory scheme as necessary to achieve
successful financial reform and to promote the interests of all
parties." This would mean that federal regulators would oversee
banking activities while state insurance regulators would oversee the
insurance functions. 124 Proponents of functional regulation indicate
it will ensure competitive equality, regulatory efficiency and
25
effectiveness, and adequate consumer protection measures.
National banks, however, fear that a state regulatory scheme could
result in discriminatory statutes that impair their ability to conduct
insurance activities, 6 This concern may be alleviated, however, if
financial reform legislation includes provisions which limit the
federal preemptory ability of any state statute that is facially or
127
actually discriminatory.

123. For example, the House Commerce Committee version of H.R. 10, the Financial
Services Act of 1997, proposes that any bank insurance activities operate under a functional
regulatory scheme. See infra note 127 discussing H.R. 10; see also Yonan, supra note 8
(IIAA supports financial affiliations as long as a functional regulatory system is used.).
124. See infranotes 128-40.
125. See Fein, supranote 120, at 90.
126. See J. Virgil Mattingly & Kieran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by
FinancialModernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25 (1998) (noting that "full functional
regulation of bank insurance activities by state insurance supervisors could permit certain
states to adopt onerous regulation designed effectively to prohibit banks from conducting
insurance activities"); see generally Kathleen W. Collins, Dysfunctional Regulation: Oh,
What a Tangled Web, BANK INS. MARKETING, Spring 1997, at 6. In the wake of the Barnett
ruling, which allowed insurance companies to sell annuities from small towns, several states
enacted discriminatory legislation "under the guise of consumer protection." Id.; see also
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing Barnett). For example, Rhode Island
enacted a statute, 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 325 (to be codified in scattered sections of R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 27), which includes advance and post-sale disclosures, physical separation of bank
and insurance sales activities, non-use of customer information, no discounts, and no
packaging of products.
127. For example, on January 7, 1997, Representative James Leach (R-Iowa) introduced
H.R. 10, the Financial Services Competition Act of 1997. Different versions of the bill
were passed by the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services and the House
Committee on Commerce in June 1997 and October 1997, respectively. See Financial
Services Competition Act of 1997, in H.R. 10, H.R REP. No. 105-164, pt. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Banking Report]; Financial Services Act of 1997, in H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt.
3 (1997) [hereinafter Commerce Report]; see also infra notes 180-92 and accompanying
text (discussing pertinent provisions of H.R. 10). The Commerce Committee version calls
for functional regulation of insurance sales and at the same time, prohibits states from
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Under functional regulation, as opposed to the current entity
regulation, each product should be regulated based on its function,
rather than on who is selling it to the public. 2 ' In other words,
similar products or services are regulated by the same governmental
entity. In terms of insurance and banking, this regulatory scheme
would mean that state insurance regulators would oversee all
insurance activities, including bank insurance activities, while the
OCC and the Federal Reserve would oversee any banking related
activities regardless of the entity.'29
Because entities will now be crossing industry lines, an
oversight agency is needed to coordinate the efforts of the regulators.
Furthermore, a mechanism should be in place for dispute
resolution. 3 ° If bank and insurance affiliations are permitted through
bank holding company subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve has stressed
the importance of a single umbrella agency, such as itself, that will
oversee the holding company parent and have preemptory rights over
all of the other regulators.13 1 The Federal Reserve argues that
oversight of the consolidated entity will make it easier to identify
problems that effect the whole bank holding company
organization.

132

preventing or restricting a national bank from engaging in any activity permitted by the bill.
See Commerce Report, supra, at §§ 104, 302-03.
128. See Once Invincible Ludwig is put on the Defensive, supra note 94.
129. See Rubin Offers Blueprintfor FinancialReform; Details Coming Soon, supranote
121, at 2.
130. For example, currently the OCC has broad authority to determine what is
considered the business of banking. The Supreme Court has indicated that the OCC should
be afforded great deference in determining what constitutes the business of banking,
including defining which products are, in fact, banking products. See NationsBank, 513
U.S. 251 (where annuities were determined by the OCC to be an investment product, not an
insurance product, despite the fact that most states defined and regulated them as such).
131. See Steven Brostoff, Volcker Wants Banks, Commerce Kept Apart, BEST's INS.
NEWS, May 19, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 9331733. The Federal Reserve Board believes
that umbrella regulation is unavoidable. See id. ("The overriding and distinctively federal
interest in safety and soundness requires that some authority, armed with adequate authority
be charged with broad oversight and surveillance over the entire holding company.")
(quoting Paul A. Volker, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
132. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 126 ("Umbrella supervision provides the
federal supervisory agencies with the ability to identify problems within the organization as
a whole, or at an affiliate of an insured bank ... and to develop strategies to protect the
insured bank before significant harm occurs.").
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Many in the financial services industries, however, dispute
the need for an overarching regulator.' These individuals reason
that functional regulation still allows federal regulators the ability to
ensure the safety and soundness of the subsidiary banks; therefore, a
supervisory bank regulator overseeing the consolidated entity is not
necessary. 34 Their concem is that a federal regulator will result in
"duplicative, costly, and burdensome regulations" for nonbank
subsidiaries overseen by other regulatory agencies.' 3 Furthermore,
opponents to umbrella regulation argue that a supervisory federal
banking regulator with preemptory ability may be in the position of
imposing capital, reporting, or examining requirements that could
significantly interfere with the operations of a nonbanking subsidiary
in order to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking
subsidiaries.' 36
Another concern in the functional regulation framework is
determining which transactions belong to which regulators. For
instance, in VALIC, the issue was whether or not annuities were
insurance.'37 Since the Court held that annuities were not insurance,
they were no longer subject solely to state regulatory authority.
Some envision a neutral agency consisting of various representatives
from the different industries who will resolve the issues over the
definition of insurance and other similar disputes. 3
Others,
however, see this agency as an unnecessary layer of regulatory
authority and instead urge that any disputes that arise between
regulators be settled not by the agency, but by the courts.'39
133. See Insurers,Banks Seek Harmony on Affiliation Details, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Feb.
18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7077347. Weller Meyer, Chief Executive Officer of
Acacia Federal Savings Bank, argued before the House Banking Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit that "no overarching federal regulator is
needed." Id. Meyers was criticizing a bill by Banking Committee Chairman, James Leach,
that would set up new bank holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve. See id.;
see also infra note 139.
134. See Insurers,Banks Seek Harmony on Affiliation Details,supranote 133.
135. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 126.

136. See id. In the case of insurance, a federal banking regulator may be in the awkward
position of sacrificing policyholder interests for those of depositors.
137. SeeNationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251; see also supra
notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 121. The Banking Committee's

version of H.R. 10 establishes a ten-member interagency council to resolve bankinginsurance disputes arising under the National Bank Act. See id.

139. For example, L. Gerald Roach, President of Mutual Assurance Society of Virginia
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Although there are some pros and cons to each method, either would
ultimately serve to promote the key benefits of functional regulation.

These benefits include: 1) competitive equality, 2) regulatory
efficiency and effectiveness, and 3) consumer protection.140

1. Competitive Equality
A key concern for those in the insurance industry is the

ability to compete on a level playing field. 141 Proponents of
functional regulation argue that under true functional regulation,
entities engaged in similar transactions and products are subject to
the same rules interpreted and administered consistently by the same
regulators. As a result, regulatory advantages will not be afforded
different entities competing in the same transactions. Proponents of
entity regulation, however, suggest that the agency responsible for
the entity can adequately administer the appropriate rules and

regulations for the various transactions in which the entity may
engage. 142
This proposal, however, ignores the potential for
inconsistent application of the rules and regulations by various
regulators operating under different motives and philosophies.
Furthermore, it shows the lack of appreciation for the complex

transactions and unique risks involved in those transactions that

and Chairman of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, argued before
the Commerce Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials that an extra layer of
regulators is "too bureaucratic" and would be an inefficient way of solving disputes among
regulators. See Insurers Fear Threats to Federal Thrift Charter,supra note 110. Roach
would instead propose an expedited federal court system where disputes would be reviewed
de novo, as opposed to providing deference to federal regulators under the Chevron
standard, within a 90 day period. See id.; see also Commerce Report, supra note 127, at §
307 (providing for expedited judicial review with conflicts resolved "based on [the court's]
review of the merits... without unequal deference").
140. See Fein, supra note 120, at 90.
141. See, e.g., ACLI Chief Sees Continued Bank-Insurance Conflict, supra note 11
(noting that Carroll Campbell, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of the American
Council of Life Insurance, "stressed the importance of a level playing field for banks ...
and insurers by requiring them to play by the same rules when it comes to regulations").
142. For example, with reference to securities regulation, opponents of entity regulation
argue that it would be "inefficient for the SEC to hire and train hundreds of new SEC
examiners to perform an oversight function that existing federal bank examiners can easily
be trained to perform." Fein, supra note 120, at 107.
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would require more than a simple training session taught by those
with inadequate experience in the particular industry.

Those in favor of functional regulation indicate that it will
also play an important role in ensuring the diversification of
economic power.'43 Some are concerned that allowing financial
services entities to affiliate will result in the concentration of

economic power in a few super financial institutions.'
This
concentration may result in a vulnerable consumer with fewer
choices.

45

In order for the smaller financial entity to survive,

proponents of functional regulation suggest that it will afford those
entities that choose not to affiliate the ability to effectively
compete.'46 If, regardless of the entity, similar transactions are
subject to the same regulations imposed by the same regulators, then
an organization will not be compelled to affiliate in order to gain
regulatory advantages.147
Many banking interests oppose functional regulation. If
insurance transactions continue to be regulated by the various states,
banks fear that local state statutes will be enacted that discriminate
against banks. 14 1 Consequently, they argue that OCC authority to
preempt state statutes is necessary to protect the bank's interests.

143. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
144. For example, former Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul A. Volcker,
commenting on bank and commercial affiliations explained that the United States "has
always had a strong aversion to massive concentrations of economic power." Brostoff,
supra note 131. This same sentiment was expressed in 1995 by the IIAA and the
Independent Bankers during their effort to stop financial services reform that included
affiliations. Robert Rusbuldt, Vice President of Federal Affairs for IIAA said "[we] believe
that free markets work, but that free markets do not truly exist in financial services, and I
believe there is a fundamental distrust of huge corporations." Mark A. Hofmann, Alliance;
Independent Bankers and Agents Join Forces to Prevent Ventures between Banks and
Insurers,Bus. INS., Nov. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7498111. Ron Ence, Director of
Legislative Affairs for 1B voiced this same sentiment when he stated that, "We do not
believe that financial concentration is good." Id.
145. For example, Robert Rusbuldt believes that concentration of credit would mean
fewer sources of credit for small business owners. See Brostoff, supra note 131.
146. See FinancialServices RestructuringHearings,supra note 117, at 28 (statement of
Mark Pope, Vice President and Director of Federal Government Relations, Lincoln National
Corporation).
147. See id. at 28-29. "Only in this way will there be assurance that the benefits and
burdens of regulation fall equally on the stand-alone company and on the company in the
same business that chooses to affiliate." Id. at 28.
148. See supra note 126.
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One way to alleviate these fears, however, is to prohibit any state law
that prevents or restricts bank insurance activities.'49
In addition, although currently there seems little incentive for
banks to level the playing field due to recent regulatory rulings that
are favorable to banks, this advantage may be short lived. 50 For

example, insurers like State Farm are not waiting for financial reform
to open the door to financial service affiliations.'
Instead they are
seeking to engage in banking activities through the unitary thrift

holding company structure by obtaining a federal savings association
charter issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision. 52 A unitary thrift
holding company may engage in any activity, including insurance, so
long as the sole thrift owned by the holding company meets the
qualified thrift lender test. 53 Bankers are now crying foul; they
claim that insurance companies have found a backdoor into the
banking business thereby creating an unfair competitive
environment.5 4 Accordingly, functional regulation ensures that all
those who are selling insurance products and those involved in
banking activities are playing by the same rules. 55

149. States are prohibited from preventing or restricting a bank from engaging directly
or indirectly in any activity permitted by the bills. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at
§ 104; Commerce Report, supra note 127, at § 104. Each version of H.R. 10 allows for
insurance agency sales by a national bank and its subsidiaries. See Banking Report, supra
note 127, at § 141; Commerce Report, supranote 127, at § 121.
150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
152. Both the Financial Services Competition Act of 1997 and the Financial Services
Act of 1997 propose to eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision by merging it with the
OCC; however, those currently engaged in activities under this structure may be able to
continue through grandfathered provisions. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 316;
Commerce Report, supra note 127, at § 316.
153. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3)(A) (1994). To be a qualified thrift lender, the thrift
must have 65% or more of its assets in qualified thrift investments. See id. § 1467a(m).
154. See Insurers Fear Threats to Federal Thrift Charter, supra note 110 (citing
position held by the American Bankers Association regarding insurers such as State Farm
that have applied for thrift charters). Bankers are concerned that the unitary thrift holding
companies will allow an "unrestricted mix of commerce and banking" resulting in unfair
advantages for these insurers. Id
155. See ACLI Chief Sees Continued Bank-Insurance Conflict, supra note 11 (citing
Carroll Campbell Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Council of
Life Insurance).
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2. Regulatory Efficiency and Effectiveness

Proponents of functional regulation argue that it would
promote regulatory efficiency by reducing conflict, duplication, and
overlap of the regulatory function.'56 Meanwhile, the current
regulatory scheme has produced confusion and uncertainty resulting
in never ending court battles.' Much time and money is spent in
legal disputes as the two industries clash in an uncertain regulatory
environment. However, under a functional regulatory scheme,
regardless of the regulatory agency that ultimately oversees a certain
financial product, the product will be regulated the same. As a
result, the potential for confusion and conflict will be greatly reduced

by clarifying the regulator's jurisdictional line. 5

Proponents of

functional regulation argue that clearly drawn lines will eliminate the
uncertainty that can hinder effective strategic planning and stifle

development and marketing
of innovative products that could benefit
59

business and consumers.
Opponents of functional regulation argue that an entity
engaged in various financial services activities would be dealing with
several different regulators. 60 Because an entity may have to report

to numerous regulators, this may result in additional costs.'6' These
expenses, however, are already incurred by the respective industries
and thus serves only to level the playing field.'62 The consumer

156. See Fein, supranote 120, at 92.
157. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (discussed supra note 73);
Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (discussed supra note
60); Texas Bankers Ass'n v. Bomer, Civ. No. A-96-CA-694-JN, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13456 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 1997).
158. See Fein, supra note 120, at 92 (citing the testimony of former Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman John Shad before the Senate Banking Committee
supporting functional regulation).
159. See FinancialServices RestructuringHearings,supra note 117, at 29 (testimony of
Mark Pope, Vice President and Director of Federal Government Relations, Lincoln National
Corporation).
160. See generally Fein, supra note 120. Due to the state insurance regulatory scheme,
an insurer operating nationwide can be subjected to up to 50 different sets of state
regulators and regulations.
161. See id.
162. Mark Pope, Vice President and Director of Federal Government Relations for
Lincoln National Corporation, reiterates this point before a congressional subcommittee by
addressing the concern of the national banks that they will now have to deal with up to fifty
state regulators instead ofjust one comptroller. "To them we suggest simply, if you wish to
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ultimately bears the cost of regulatory reviews, but the trade off is a
regulatory scheme designed to adequately and effectively protect the
63

consumer. 1

In addition to reducing regulatory conflict, proponents of
functional regulation suggest that it will decrease overlap and
duplication of the regulatory function. Currently, the OCC permits
national banks to conduct certain insurance activities subject to state

regulation.' 64 The OCC does not interfere, but it does maintain
preemptory power if the state's regulation "significantly interferes"
or "impairs" a bank's authorized activities.1 65 At first glance, this
position appears to be an effort by the OCC to provide for functional
regulation of bank insurance activities. The OCC, however, has
indicated that it would preempt any state law that "restricts a national
bank's insurance activity.1 66 Arguably, any state insurance law
might restrict bank insurance activity and thus create confusion and
double regulation. 67 As a result, banks that currently sell insurance
are potentially accountable to more than one regulator for the same
transaction.1 68
Functional regulation would eliminate this

duplication of efforts.
be in the insurance business, you should not object to playing by the same rules which
govern all other sellers and underwriters of insurance." The Definitions of Insurance and
Banking in H.R. 10: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous
Materials of the Committee of Commerce, 105th Cong. (statement of Mark Pope, Vice
President and Director of Federal Government Relations, Lincoln National Corporation)
(July 25, 1997), availablein 1997 WL 11235301.
163. See id.; see also infra note 168 and accompanying text. Consumers will benefit
from regulators who possess the appropriate knowledge and expertise of the transactions
they are regulating.
164. See James M. Cain, FinancialInstitutions and Insurance in 1996: Three Strikes,
You're Out?, 52 Bus. LAW. 1117, 1122 (1997 (citing OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, supra
note 16).
165. See id.
166. OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, supra note 16.
167. The OCC is relying on the Court's "significantly interferes" language articulated in
Barnett. See OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, supra note 16, at n.7. The OCC interprets that
language to "reflect that a relatively small level of impact on the authority of national banks
is sufficient to result in federal preemption of the state law at issue." Id.
168. In a "White Paper" released by the National Association of Mutual Insurance
Companies, the role of the OCC is considered unacceptable. See Steven Brostoff, NAMIC
Announces Supportfor FederalFinancialServices Reform, NAT'L UNDERWRIER PROP. &
CASUALTY-RiSK & BEN. MGMT., Apr. 21, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 9332110 ("The
current system, in which the OCC is the final arbiter of defining and regulating insurance
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Finally, proponents of functional regulation urge that it will
result in more effective and consistent oversight. This is achieved by
allowing those with the greatest experience in assessing the risks
associated with a product's activities'69 to continue to regulate those
products by applying a consistent regulatory philosophy. 7
In
response, proponents of the entity based regulatory structure argue
that the various financial products can be regulated under the same
basic legal structure that would be applied under a functional
regulatory scheme. 7 ' The only difference, however, would be that
the agency responsible for the entity would apply the rules rather
than an agency responsible for the product. This argument, however,
over-simplifies the issue by assuming that banking regulators and
insurance regulators would apply the rules consistently and under the
same basic philosophy. The potential for unequal application could
create an unlevel playing field for the respective industries.
3. Consumer Protection
Of paramount concern for legislators and industry interest
groups is the continuation of consumer protection laws and
standards.'72 Many believe that the current regulatory scheme will
result in the deterioration of consumer protection laws as banks
continue to expand into traditionally state-regulated insurance
areas. 7 3 Legislators and industry interest groups often cite concerns
activities of banks, is untenable and will result in an expensive, unworkable and
discriminatory system of dual regulation.").
169. See Once Invincible Ludwig is Put on the Defensive, supra note 94 ("[Banks] have
to pay attention to the risks and understand the expertise required in [performing insurance
services.] The Academy's concern is that in the rush toward financial modernization,
essential state laws aren't rehashed and [are] weakened.") (quoting Lauren Bloom, General
Counsel of the Academy of Actuaries).
170. See Fein, supra note 120, at 92 (citing Hearings Before the subcommittee on
Securities ofthe Senate Committee on Banking, Housingand Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 35
(1982) (statement of John Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission)). In
addition, many insurance products, especially property and casualty products, are
geographically specific. Thus, the task of understanding the issues associated with the
various products are more appropriately allocated among various regulators intimately
familiar with the area and product. This would be an onerous task for one centralized
agency such as the OCC.
171. See id. at 107.
172. See Yonan, supranote 8.
173. See generally Life Agents FearEntry of Banks into Insurance, BEST'S INS. NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7078794. David Malkin, past President of the
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such as consumer perception that insurance products are federally
insured, illegal tying of bank and insurance products, and the
weakening of state insurance licensing laws."' Banking regulators
are primarily interested in protecting depositors, while state
insurance regulators are focused on the well being of policyholders.
Proponents of functional regulation urge that because of these
different objectives, a federal regulator responsible for both
industries may be forced to sacrifice the interests of policyholders in
order to boost bank profits and protect depositors.'
Proponents
contend that functional regulation will ensure that consumer
protection of both depositors and policyholders is preserved.
Finally, proponents argue that functional rather than entity
regulation will encourage the availability of the widest range of
financial products at the lowest cost to the public.176 If a financial
service firm fails, it will be on its merits rather than because of
arbitrary differences in government regulation. 177 Consumers and
industry alike will profit from the new and innovative products
encouraged by a market driven system rather than by arbitrary
differences in entity regulation. 7
Some argue, however, that
National Association of Underwriters, stresses the importance of state regulation in
protecting consumers from the "silent coercion" of the banks. Id.
174. See IIAA Survey, supra note 102.
175. In an analogous situation, Former SEC Chairman John Shad expressed concern
over the varying regulatory philosophies of the SEC and federal banking regulators. A
bank regulator's "statutory mandate gives priority to the protection of banks and their
depositors over protection of investors. Thus, their expertise in the protection of investors
is not as great as that of the SEC." Fein, supra note 120, at 91 (citing Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Sec. of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
97th Cong. 9 (1982) (testimony of SEC Chairman John Shad supporting functional
regulation).
176. See Fein, supra note 120, at 95, (citing Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the
Task Group on Regulation of FinancialServices, 1050 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (Nov.
16, 1984)). In 1984, the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, chaired by VicePresident George Bush, prepared a congressional report supporting the concept of
functional regulation in the securities industry. See id.
177. See id. An example of a regulatory advantage noted in the Task Group Report was
interest rate controls. See id "The application of interest rate controls to time deposits in
depository institutions, while no such controls were applicable to money market funds, was
a classic case of the regulatory system failing to regulate fungible products in an equivalent
manner, thereby dictating the success of one type of product in the marketplace due to
arbitrary differences in regulatory controls." Id.
178. See id.
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functional regulation and particularly the state regulatory scheme
will actually act as a disincentive to develop new products." 9
Varying state regulations will make it difficult for a bank to offer its
products on an interstate basis. This is not a new problem, however,
since insurance companies operating in more than one state are faced
with the same concerns. Furthermore, the benefits in focused
consumer protection laws tailored to the needs of each state outweigh
the regulatory inconvenience facing all of those who chose to engage
in insurance transactions.
C.

CurrentLegislation

Financial reform has made some progress in the 105th
Congressional session. The Financial Modernization Act of 1997,
backed by House Banking Chairman, Jim Leach (R-Iowa), has
survived the first round of the legislative process. One version of the
bill passed the House Banking Committee in June 1997 and another
version passed the House Commerce Committee in October 1997.180
Each version provides for significant reform of laws governing both
national banks and insurance companies. The versions are consistent
on certain key issues regarding bank insurance powers.
Both versions of the bill prohibit states from preventing or
restricting bank and insurance affiliations.'
Furthermore, they
propose an alternate form of a bank holding company that will
engage in a full range of financial activities, including insurance
underwriting." 2 In addition, both versions of the bill retain the
authority of the Federal Reserve Board to examine all bank holding
companies and their subsidiaries; however, in an effort to reduce
costs, the proposed legislation imposes limitations in order to restrict

179. For example, the European Union "views our state-based regulatory system as a
barrier to free trade" and thus has threatened to take retaliatory action. Larry G. Mayewski
et al., The New Value Proposition, BEST's REV., LFE-HEALTH INS. ED., Jan. 1, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 9745370.
180. See Banking Report, supranote 127; Commerce Report, supranote 127.
181. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 104; Commerce Report, supra note 127,

at § 104.
182. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at §§ 102-03; Commerce Report, supra note
127, at §§ 102-03. These proposals reverse the 1982 amendments to the Bank Holding Act
or the Garn-St. Germain Act. See supranote 10.
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the Board's focus and scope."' Furthermore, both versions of the

bill prohibit a national bank and its subsidiary from underwriting
insurance except for certain grandfathered activities."' However, the
proposed legislation does permit insurance agency activities."'

Despite the similarities in the two versions of the bill, they
differ on key issues regarding bank insurance activities. These issues
highlight the continued congressional struggle toward financial

reform.

Since both versions allow national banks to engage in

insurance activities, the issue becomes what is the definition of
insurance and who is the appropriate regulatory agency. Each

version of the bill provides a definition of insurance for both existing
and potential products. 6 Each version also establishes a mechanism
for resolving disputes over the interpretation of the insurance

definition. The Banking Committee bill creates a National Council
on Financial Services to resolve disputes arising under the National
Bank Act.'87 The Commerce Committee bill, however, calls for an
expedited judicial review over definitional disputes of regulators.' 88
The court must resolve the conflict "based on its review of the merits
...without unequal deference."'8 9 Finally, once the product has

183. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 131. The Board's examination should be
limited "to the fullest extent possible" to the bank holding company itself and any nonbank
subsidiary that could have a materially adverse effect on the safety and soundness of any
bank affiliate. See id.; Commerce Report, supra note 127, at § 111. The Board's
examination is limited to functionally regulated nondepository institution subsidiaries of
bank holding companies that: (1) engage in activities that pose a material risk to an
affiliated depository institution, or (2) fail to comply with the Financial Services Act of
19971 or restrictions on affiliate transactions. See id.
The Board cannot make a
compliance determination without conducting an examination. See id.
184. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at §§ 141, 151; Commerce Report, supra note
127, at §§ 121,304.
185. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 141; Commerce Report, supra note 127,
at § 121.
186. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at § 151; Commerce Report, supra note 127,
at § 304.
187. See Banking Report, supra note 127, at §§ 121-22.
188. See Commerce Report, supra note 127, at § 307.
189. See id. This provision essentially makes the Chevron standard of review
inapplicable to insurance. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that where a statute is ambiguous, the courts
will defer to the reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency); see also supra note
53 and accompanying text.
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been appropriately classified, only the Commerce Committee version
expressly provides for functional regulation of insurance sales
activities, including state licensing of insurance agents. 9 The House
Banking Committee bill does not have a similar provision.
Despite the significant strides during the 105th congressional
session a full house vote is unlikely this session. Neither the
insurance nor the banking interests like the idea of oversight of
insurance activities by the Federal Reserve as provided for in both
proposals. 9 ' Furthermore, key differences involving state regulatory
authority and provisions regarding the definition of insurance will
continue to cause significant debate. As a result of this and other
provisions considered unacceptable by both the insurance and
banking industries, financial services modernization legislation is
unlikely to be approved in the 105th Congressional Session, which
ends in October 1998.92
V. CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether the 105th Congress is able to pass
financial services reform legislation, future legislative change is
inevitable. Reform is necessary in order to provide consumers with
new and innovative products. Reform legislation, however, must be
carefully crafted to ensure consumer protection. In addition,
financial services providers are entitled to fair competition and
clearly defined regulatory boundaries. Financial deregulation by
administrative interpretation and judicial policy making during the
current decade have upset the traditional roles assumed by banks and
190. See Commerce Report, supra note 127, at §§ 302-03.
191. See, e.g., Kentucky Official Seeks Respect for State Regulators, BEST'S INS. NEWS,
July 21, 1997, 1997 WL 7078313. George Nichols III, Kentucky Commissioner of
Insurance, stated that he supports the provision of the Banking Committee bill that
establishes distinct affiliates, but because the Federal Reserve would be setting reserve
requirements, this might impair a state insurance regulator from ensuring proper capital
standards. See id. Banking interests also are concerned that the OCC has been stripped of
its rule-making powers regarding bank insurance activities. For example, Julie Williams,
General Counsel for the 0CC, stated that "the total package contains significant rollbacks in
the current authority of national banks." Letter from Julie Williams, General Counsel,
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, to Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency
(June 24, 1997) (on file with OCC).
192. See Sun Sets on FinancialModernization, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Sept. 29,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 14246923.
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insurance companies. In addition, insurance industry advocates and
members of Congress have raised concerns that the OCC's issuance
of individual interpretive letters, guidelines, and regulations has
complicated the regulatory framework of insurance and that federal
comprehensive legislation is necessary. 93 Furthermore, judicial
decisions have effectively endorsed this manner of financial
reform.

194

Although recent changes seem to be part of an aggressive,
perhaps reckless, advancement of banking interests into new
financial arenas, these changes have been the essential catalyst to
springboard financial reform. The significant wins for the banking
industry, primarily in the courts and regulatory fronts, have forced
insurance interests to reevaluate their position on financial
affiliations and have brought them to the negotiating table. National
banks' current reign, however, will most certainly prove short-lived.
Although banks may feel that business as usual is preferable to new
legislation, without some cooperation or compromise, they may find
the legislative backlash to be detrimental. Thus, the most likely
outcome will be a compromise between the two industries that
addresses the most significant concerns of each.
National banks are likely to be granted unrestricted access
into the insurance and other financial markets. Insurance companies
will demand functional regulation and consumer protection laws that
ensure a level, competitive playing field. Legislation that addresses
these concerns and interests is realistic and obtainable. Repealing
section 92 and permitting banks to enter the insurance markets
through a functional regulatory scheme will ensure competitive

193. See Glancz et al., supranote 88.
194. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (discussed supra notes 72-75
and accompanying text); Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995) (discussed supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text); Independent Ins. Agents of
Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussed supra notes 55-59 and

accompanying text).
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equality, safeguard consumer interests, and provide for less costly,
new, and innovative financial services products.
LINDA BIRKIN TIGGES

